

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2251  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 11079

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PASS TO DOE

E.O.11652:XGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM US UK UR  
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH  
SOVIETS

CTB MESSAGE NO.262

1. SUMMARY: IN A CONTINUATION OF BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS  
WITH SOVIET SIDE, WARNKE, JOHNSON, NEIDLE AND HECKROTTE  
MET WITH PETROSYANTS, TIMERBAEV, TARASOV AND BEZUMOV ON  
JULY 15. WARNKE SAID THAT US, AS STATED BY VANCE TO  
GROMYKO, WAS IN FAVOR OF COMPREHENSIVE TREATY AND THAT  
ARTICLE I SHOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM. WARNKE THEN POSED  
SERIES OF QUESTIONS ON NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS IN ORDER  
TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF PETROSYANTS' REMARKS IN PREVIOUS  
MEETING. MOST OF DISCUSSION CENTERED ON ON-SITE  
INSPECTIONS, WITH PETROSYANTS MAKING A PITCH FOR SOVIET  
POSITIONS ON NUMBER OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, DURATION OF  
ON-SITE INSPECTION, LIST OF BASIC EQUIPMENT, AND  
PHOTOGRAPHY. WARNKE EXPLAINED US VIEWS. END SUMMARY.

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2. ARTICLE I -- THE BASIC PROHIBITION OF TREATY. WARNKE  
SAID THAT, AS SECRETARY VANCE HAD INDICATED TO FOREIGN  
MINISTER GROMYKO, THE UNITED STATES WAS IN FAVOR OF A  
COMPREHENSIVE TREATY, AND ARTICLE I WAS THEREFORE NOT A  
PROBLEM. THE SOVIET TEXT SEEMED, IN SUBSTANCE, SIMILAR  
TO THAT OF THE US WORKING PAPER OF DECEMBER 7, ALTHOUGH

WE MIGHT HAVE SOME CHANGES TO SUGGEST REGARDING THE DETAILS OF THE LANGUAGE. THE POLITICAL WORKING GROUP COULD WORK OUT THE TEXT. PETROSYANTS ASKED IF THE US ACCEPTED THE SOVIET TEXT. WARNKE REITERATED THAT HE SAW NO BASIC PROBLEMS, BUT WE MIGHT HAVE TEXTUAL SUGGESTIONS.

3. NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS). WARNKE SAID THAT HE WANTED TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF PETROSYANTS' REMARKS ON NSS MADE ON JULY 14. IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR THE TWO SIDES TO KNOW HOW CLOSE OR HOW FAR APART THEY REALLY WERE. WITH RESPECT TO THE PHASING APPROACH OUTLINED IN THAT MEETING, HOW MANY STATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE DATA EXCHANGE DID THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND? WARNKE REPEATED THE US PROPOSAL OF 15. HOW DID THE SOVIET SIDE INTEND THAT THE STATIONS BE UPGRADED? WITH US EQUIPMENT? WOULD ALL THE DATA BE AVAILABLE AND AUTHENTICATED? IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE CLARITY IN THE SOVIET RESPONSE. PETROSYANTS AGREED THAT THESE WERE APPROPRIATE AND IMPORTANT QUESTIONS. HE PROPOSED TO DEAL WITH THEM IN A MEETING ON JULY 17.

4. ON-SITE INSPECTION (OSI). PETROSYANTS SAID HE HAD A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS. THE SOVIET SIDE STARTED FROM THE PREMISE THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD VIOLATE THE TREATY. THE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION WAS TO SHOW THE WORLD THAT BOTH SIDES WERE COMPLYING WITH THE TREATY. FOR AN OSI, FIFTEEN  
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PEOPLE WERE SUFFICIENT TO CONDUCT AN OSI TO SHOW THAT AN AMBIGUOUS EVENT WAS NOT CAUSED BY A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THE US HAD ASKED FOR 30 PEOPLE BUT THE SOVIETS SAW NO NEED FOR THAT MANY AND HAD EXPLAINED WHY. WARNKE SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SEE WHERE THE PROBLEM WAS. IF INDEED THE SOVIET SIDE ONLY NEEDED 15 PEOPLE THEY COULD SEND THAT MANY. THE US BELIEVED 30 PEOPLE WERE NECESSARY, HAD EXPLAINED WHY, AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO SEND THAT MANY. OF COURSE, IF THE SOVIETS WANTED TO SEND 30, THEY COULD ALSO. THE NUMBER OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WAS ALSO RELATED TO THE TIME PERIOD FOR AN OSI: 15 PEOPLE FOR 20 DAYS WAS INADEQUATE. PETROSYANTS SAID THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WAS MORE RELATED TO THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THERE WERE ONLY ONE INSPECTION, THEN THE US PROPOSAL MIGHT NOT BE SO BAD. WARNKE AGAIN SAID HE COULD NOT SEE THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET OBJECTION. THE NUMBERS WERE MAXIMUM VALUES. IF EXPERIENCE SHOWED FEWER WERE SATISFACTORY, THEN FEWER WOULD BE SENT. IT WAS IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST TO HAVE ADEQUATE INSPECTIONS. IF THERE WAS NOT A SERIOUS APPROACH TO INSPECTION, OTHERS MIGHT HAVE SUSPICIONS THAT WE WERE CONTINUING TO TEST. BOTH PETROSYANTS AND WARNKE SAID THEY WOULD THINK OVER THE ARGUMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE.

5. PETROSYANTS THEN URGED THE US TO ADOPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF 20 DAYS FOR OSI DURATION. IF IT TURNED OUT THAT 20 DAYS WERE NOT SUFFICIENT IT COULD BE EXTENDED. THERE WOULD BE AN EXPRESS PROVISION IN THE AGREEMENT PERMITTING SUCH EXTENSIONS. WARNKE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS

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NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A DURATION WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE INSPECTION TO BE CARRIED OUT ADEQUATELY. THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AND DURATION WERE RELATED, AND IN US VIEW, THE US PROPOSALS (30 PEOPLE AND 30 DAYS) WERE NECESSARY BASED UPON OUR ANALYSIS OF THE TASK. IF EXPERIENCE SHOWED THAT LESS TIME WERE NEEDED, LESS TIME WOULD BE USED.

6. PETROSYANTS, TURNING TO THE LIST OF BASIC EQUIPMENT, SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE CONDUCTING AN OSI IN THE US WOULD ASK THE US TO PROVIDE SEISMOMETERS AND MICRO-PROCESSORS, AND HE COULD SEE NO REASON WHY THE US COULD NOT DEPEND UPON THE SOVIET SIDE TO PROVIDE SUCH EQUIPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION. WARNKE SAID THAT THE PURPOSE OF OSI WAS TO PROVIDE REASSURANCE. WHAT WAS WRONG WITH A SIDE BRINGING ITS OWN EQUIPMENT IF THAT FACILITATED AN OSI? IT WAS EFFICIENT TO BRING, FOR EXAMPLE, SEISMOMETERS WITH WHICH ONE HAD FAMILIARITY. BOTH SIDES COULD HAVE MORE CONFIDENCE IN THE RESULTS IF THE DESIGNATED PERSONNEL

USED THEIR OWN EQUIPMENT. HE ASKED WHAT WAS THE ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE HERE. PETROSYANTS SAID THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT SECRET

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DOCUMENT, SHOWING THE WORLD WE WERE TOGETHER AND VERIFYING EACH OTHER. A LONG LIST WOULD RAISE QUESTIONS WHETHER SOME ITEMS WERE MISSING. WARNKE NOTED THAT THE LIST WAS NOT LONG. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE BASIC EQUIPMENT NECESSARY FOR VERIFICATION BE INCLUDED. IT WOULD ENHANCE THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT.

7. PETROSYANTS THEN TURNED TO EQUIPMENT FOR FIXING POSITION OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL. THIS WAS A SEPARATE QUESTION. THERE WERE MANY WAYS TO FIND POSITION. ONE WOULD BE SELECTED AND THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE TREATMENT OF THE ISSUE.

8. PETROSYANTS ASKED BEZUMOV TO STATE THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S VIEWS ON PHOTOGRAPHY. BEZUMOV REITERATED THE SOVIET VIEW THAT PERSONNEL OF THE HOST PARTY, IN TAKING PICTURES REQUESTED BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, SHOULD USE HOST PARTY EQUIPMENT. THE US VIEW THAT EQUIPMENT OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL SHOULD BE USED WOULD LEAD TO COMPLICATED PROCEDURES. WARNKE SAID THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO MINIMIZE SOURCES OF FRICTION BETWEEN SIDES. THE US APPROACH WOULD ASSURE QUALITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS. IF PHOTOGRAPHS ARE OF POOR QUALITY, THE FAULT WILL LIE WITH EQUIPMENT, NOT WITH HOST PARTY. HOST HAS CONTROL OF PICTURE TAKING. THESE PROCEDURES MINIMIZE POSSIBILITY OF DISPUTES. WHAT WAS THE OBJECTION? PETROSYANTS SAID HE SAW NO NEED FOR DESIGNATED PERSONNEL TO BRING PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT, MENTIONING, AS AN EXAMPLE, DEVELOPING EQUIPMENT. WARNKE REITERATED POINT THAT US APPROACH PUT RESPONSIBILITY FOR QUALITY OF PHOTOGRAPHS ON REQUESTING PARTY. PETROSYANTS SAID MEANS COULD BE DEvised WHICH WOULD ASSURE THAT PHOTOGRAPHS TURNED OVER TO DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WERE OF OBJECT TAKEN. WARNKE SAID THE PROBLEM SECRET

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WASN'T MERELY TO ENSURE THAT THE RIGHT PICTURE WAS TAKEN AND PROVIDED, BUT ALSO TO ENSURE THAT THE QUALITY WAS SATISFACTORY.

9.COMMENT: A POINT OF INTEREST REGARDING THE FAIRLY RIGID PRESENTATION OF SOVIET POSITIONS ON OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS IS THAT THE SOVIETS BROUGHT ALONG TO A RESTRICTED

MEETING, FOR THE FIRST TIME, S.V. PATRAKEYEV, KNOWN TO BE  
A SENIOR KGB MEMBER OF THEIR DELEGATION. IT OCCURS TO US  
THAT PETROSYANTS MAY HAVE WANTED TO INCLUDE PATRAKEYEV  
IN ORDER TO LET THE KGB SEE HOW STOUTLY PETROSYANTS  
DEFENDED THE SOVIET APPROACH ON QUESTIONS BOUND TO BE  
SENSITIVE FOR THE KGB. PETROSYANTS MAY ALSO HAVE WANTED  
TO EXPOSE THE KGB REP TO THE STRONG COUNTER- ARGUMENTS  
OF THE US SIDE. IN ANY EVENT, WE GATHER THAT SOVIET  
SECURITY OFFICIALS ARE HIGHLY INTERESTED IN THE NEGOTIATION  
OF PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR INSPECTION AND FOREIGN PER-  
SONNEL ON SOVIET TERRITORY, AND WE ASSUME THAT THIS FACTOR  
WILL MAKE OUR TASK MORE DIFFICULT. JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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